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Abstract
We employ a two-country overlapping-generations model to explore
the international dimension of household portfolio choices induced by
the asymmetric provision of government-run pensions. We study the
resulting patterns of risk-sharing and the corresponding welfare e¤ects
on both home and foreign agents. Introducing the dened benets pay-
as-you-go system at home increases the welfare of all other agents at
the expense of the home workers and improves the degree of intergen-
erational risk sharing abroad. Conversely, a dened contributions sys-
tem leads to welfare losses of both home cohorts accompanied by gains
abroad, but does increase the extent of intergenerational risk sharing at
home.
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1 Introduction
As Shiller (1999) forcefully argues, risk sharing is the key objective of a state-
run retirement system. While such a system may serve to mitigate saving
myopia on the part of some individuals or to redistribute wealth within a
society, its primary function is to protect the elderly from poverty via risk-
sharing contracts that cannot be provided by private markets. In theory, a
retiree can share her idiosyncratic risks with three groups of people: local
young (intergenerational risk-sharing), local elderly (intragenerational), and
foreign agents (international). In practice, the former group may be too young
(or not even yet born) to be able to legally participate in such insurance
schemes, creating room for a government-run pension system that can transfer
risk across multiple generations. Most of the literature on the structure and
welfare e¤ects of such pension systems focuses on the interactions between
di¤erent cohorts within a country. However, the rapid pace of globalization
during the last four decades created a multitude of opportunities for cross-
border risk-sharing and therefore all but ensured that national policies have
important international spillovers that must not be ignored when designing
and evaluating government programs such as the provision of pensions.
In a recent paper, Staveley-OCarroll and Staveley-OCarroll (2017) doc-
ument and analyze the impact of asymmetries in the structure of national
pension systems on international nancial capital allocation. The authors
show that specic features of a countrys pension system inuence its workers
consumption-saving decisions and have a direct impact on the composition of
their international investment portfolios.1 An immediate follow-up question,
taken up in this paper, is to quantify the welfare e¤ects of these portfolio real-
locations on both home and foreign agents and to study the resulting patterns
of intergenerational and international risk-sharing induced by the introduction
1Dicks-Mireaux and King (1983), Hubbard (1985), and Ligon (1995) report statistically
signicant e¤ects of social security wealth on household portfolio decisions, although no
study explicitly includes foreign nancial assets. Using reduced-form closed economy life
cycle models, Hubbard et al. (1995) and Hubener et al. (2016) study how the presence of a
social insurance program can inuence household wealth accumulation (the former study)
and portfolio choices (the latter paper).
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of a pension system in the home economy. As more and more governments con-
template reforms of their national pension systems made ever less sustainable
by the global demographic shifts, it is important to understand (even if not
explicitly take into account) the resulting cross-border nancial readjustments
that can in turn a¤ect the extent of international business cycle propagation.
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the rst paper to rigorously study
international welfare e¤ects of national social security systems, although a case
for such a study was outlined in Shiller (1999). As such, our results augment
the existing research that has so far focused on the within-country measures of
welfare. One of the key results from the existing literature in this area shows
that a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social security system is welfare-reducing due to
its crowding-out e¤ect on national savings, capital accumulation, and growth
(Diamond, 1965; Samuelson, 1975; Bruce and Turnovsky, 2013; Harenberg and
Ludwig, 2015). On the other hand, social security can provide missing intra-
and/or intergenerational insurance opportunities against aggregate and idio-
syncratic shocks when nancial markets are incomplete (Bohn, 1999; Shiller,
1999; Storesletten et al., 1999; Krueger and Kubler, 2006; Sánchez-Marcos
and Sánchez-Martín, 2006; Harenberg and Ludwig, 2015), which under cer-
tain circumstances can outweigh the growth-dampening e¤ect of the program.
In a study with a focus similar to ours, Beetsma et al. (2011) show that in-
stitutional design and investment strategies of a government-run fully funded
pension fund in a two-pillar pension system can a¤ect both intergenerational
and international risk sharing in a fully symmetric two-period model. Com-
plementing and extending the existing work in this eld, we set aside the cap-
ital accumulation considerations and use the overlapping generations (OLG)
framework to study jointly the national and international risk-sharing, capital
allocation, and welfare consequences of private investment decisions induced
by the existence of a PAYG pension system in one of the two countries.
Ours is a two-country, two-cohort OLG model in which both countries
function as endowment economies with di¤erentiated home and foreign goods.
To properly capture the risk-sharing aspects of the economy, we carefully dif-
ferentiate between risk aversion and intertemporal elasticity of substitution
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by employing Epstein-Zin preferences. Financial markets, in which agents can
trade internationally in debt and equity assets, are incomplete for two reasons.
First, cohorts cannot exchange risk with each other since shocks are realized
only after the young workers are born. Second, human capital is assumed to
be nontradable, so that the retirees cannot purchase claims on the wages of
workers. In their rst period of life, consumers in each country earn wages
and invest a portion of their earnings into an array of nancial assets. We
assume that the home country maintains a PAYG retirement system, whereas
the consumers in the foreign economy have to make their own retirement sav-
ings arrangements. More specically, the home government imposes a tax on
current workers and immediately distributes the proceeds to retirees. In the
second (and last) period, retirees consume the payouts of their investments as
well as the pension payments. Risk sharing is imperfect: local wage (dividend)
shocks a¤ect primarily the local young (retirees), although the young workers
structure their portfolios in a way that does allow for some pooling of risks
across di¤erent agent groups.
To obtain our welfare results, we rst simulate the model without the
pension system in either economy and record the resulting baseline expected
welfare levels of the four agents (home and foreign, young and old). We then
repeat the simulations having added a dened benet (DB) PAYG system to
the home economy and calculate the compensating variations the percent
changes in current consumption required to make each of the four agents in-
di¤erent to the introduction of the social security system. We nd that adding
the DB PAYG pension framework in the home economy increases the average
welfare of all other agents in the model at the expense of the home workers. At
this point, it is important to clarify our language: the terms "added" or "intro-
duced" refer to the di¤erences between distinct modeling frameworks with
or without social security rather than to transitional dynamics (that is, the
explicit shift within the same model from having no pension system to start-
ing it at a particular point in time). As such, our welfare comparisons of the
di¤erent pension structures should be interpreted as pertaining to economies
that have fully completed their transitions to a particular state-run pension
4
framework.2
To better understand these results, we must consider the impact of the so-
cial security system, which, in essence, is a nontradable nancial asset designed
by the government, on the extent of risk sharing that agents can achieve using
private nancial markets. The young home cohorts loss, widely documented
in the literature, stems from the loss of potential earnings in nancial markets
to the pension tax, since the PAYG system o¤ers a zero real rate of return (in
the absence of population growth). The gains to foreigners a key contribu-
tion of this study deserve further attention. The DB structure of the home
retirement system reduces the overall riskiness of the home consumers life-
time wealth by supplementing their stochastic future income with a risk-free
second-period pension payment. In response, the home workers increase their
holdings of (risky) home and foreign equity, nancing them by borrowing from
abroad. The resulting portfolio reallocation allows home workers to share the
risk reduction induced by the PAYG system with the foreign consumers: the
latter can o­ oad some of their risky assets in exchange for (relatively safer)
bonds. In fact, while doing little to improve risk sharing elsewhere in the
model, the DB PAYG system increases the degree of intergenerational risk
sharing in the foreign economy.
A di¤erent pattern of welfare spillovers emerges when we replace the DB
system with a dened contribution (DC) structure. Both home cohorts expe-
rience welfare losses accompanied by gains abroad. Home workers no longer
gain the increase in the security of their future income that characterizes the
DB system, since the retirees get a portion of the stochastic wage income of
the workers instead of a risk-free lump-sum payment. A corresponding drop in
the equity investments of the young cohort translates into lower consumption
(and so welfare) in retirement. Foreigners must now hold most of their portfo-
lio risk rather than selling it to the home workers, but are rewarded with the
corresponding higher average returns. As opposed to the DB structure, the
2A related and extensive strand of literature has undertaken the study of the transi-
tion period per se and of its implied welfare e¤ects on di¤erent groups of economic agents.
For reviews of the existing papers, see Feldstein and Liebman (2002), Diamond (2004), and
Aubuchon et al. (2011).
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DC system leads to much higher risk sharing within generations and interna-
tionally. Home young and old are now sharing wage risk more equally, and
this risk can also be hedged internationally via appropriately chosen portfolios
of the home and foreign workers. This argument echoes the ndings in Shiller
(1999) and Krueger and Kubler (2006): with imperfectly correlated capital
and labor returns, a PAYG social security system enables agents to pool the
two sources of income and thereby improves on the limited risk-sharing oppor-
tunities o¤ered by incomplete private nancial markets.
Due to computational complexity of solving our model globally, we abstract
from several important mechanisms that a¤ect the functioning of pension sys-
tems, such as population growth, tax elasticity of labor supply, intra-cohort
heterogeneity, and uncertainty regarding the duration of retirement. While
undoubtedly essential for a complete understanding of the impact of such sys-
tems on the macroeconomy, these limitations allow us to provide a sharp focus
on the relatively unexplored question of international welfare e¤ects of asym-
metric pension provisions. At the same time, our modeling assumptions imply
that the main emphasis of our work is on the direction of the cross-border wel-
fare spillovers rather than on their absolute magnitude. Our ndings should be
viewed as supplementing other welfare gains and losses associated with social
security systems that have been documented elsewhere in the literature.
The organization of the paper is as follows. We present the theoretical
model and our calibration strategy in Section 2. The third section describes
consumer portfolio choice and the resulting patterns of risk sharing in the
baseline model, and the changes induced in these variables by the introduction
of the DB and DC social security systems. Section 4 explores the international
welfare outcomes of these portfolio allocation decisions and thereby of the
asymmetric provisions of national pension schemes, with several robustness
checks reported in Section 5. Finally, we summarize our ndings and list
several future extensions of our work in Section 6.
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2 Model
The model, taken directly from Staveley-OCarroll and Staveley-OCarroll
(2017), features two countries with overlapping-generations consumers who
receive stochastic imperfectly correlated wage and dividend income and can
trade bond and equity assets across national borders. The two economies di¤er
only in the pension system provision. In the home country, the government
administers a pure PAYG social security system, in which each period a por-
tion of the workersstochastic earnings are transferred to the retirees. In the
foreign economy, workers must rely solely on private nancial markets to save
for retirement. In this section, the indicator i = fh; fg denotes equations that
hold for both the home and foreign cohorts.
As a matter of notation, superscripts are used to denote agent-specic
variables (country of residence and period of birth), whereas subscripts will
refer to economy-wide indicators such as country of production and the time
period. Below, we outline the most salient features of the model and the
solution methodology and refer the interested reader to the original paper for
details.
2.1 Production
Both countries have endowment economies. Perishable output of each country
is comprised of wages and dividends,
yi;t = wi;t + di;t;
each of which is in turn determined exogenously by a two-state Markov process.
Thus, home wages wh;t can be either low, Wh;1, or high, Wh;2, and evolve
according to the following symmetric transition matrix:
P (wh;t = Wh;1jwh;t 1 = Wh;1) = P (wh;t = Wh;2jwh;t 1 = Wh;2) = w;h:
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Home dividends, foreign wages, and foreign dividends follow analogous processes
with parameters fDh;1; Dh;2; d;hg, fWf;1;Wf;2; w;fg, and fDf;1; Df;2; d;fg, re-
spectively.
The home and foreign outputs are combined into consumption bundles,
available to the young and old cohorts in the home and foreign countries,


























for j = ft; t  1g (2)
where  measures the elasticity of substitution between imports and exports.
The time-varying parameter i;t captures the extent of home bias in consump-
tion3
i;t  i + et
where et is an i.i.d. process with et 2 f e; eg.
The exogenous state of the economy can be dened as zt = fet; wh;t; wf;t; dh;t; df;tg,
which follows a rst-order Markov process with nitely many states, Z =
fz1; :::; z32g.
Given the prices Ph;t and Pf;t of the home and foreign output measured in






























3Judd, Kubler, and Schmedders (2003) show that in a standard Lucas tree model with
time-separable preferences, complete asset markets, and no nancial frictions, agentsport-
folios are typically constant over time and states of nature; consequently, capital ows are
absent in equilibrium. Since we want the portfolio choices of the households to evolve en-
dogenously from any starting value in response to pension system asymmetries, we must
move away from the assumption of complete markets. Having more shocks (ve in our
model) than assets (four) is a su¢ cient condition for asset market incompleteness.
8
where St is the nominal exchange rate, expressed in units of home currency
per one unit of foreign currency. In the rest of the paper, we deate all prices
by the local CPI and refer to these real variables using lower-case letters.






Agents are representative within each cohort and optimize their behavior over
their working years and retirement. By assuming zero population growth, we
maintain equal sizes of the two cohorts, normalized to unity, in all periods.
The young cohort earns wages, pays social security taxes, and saves a portion
of its disposable income for retirement. The old cohort consumes all of its
savings, dividend income, and pension benets.
Workers born in period t derive utility from current consumption and their
future value function using Epstein-Zin (EZ) preferences, while retired workers













where  discounts future consumption,  controls relative risk aversion, and
 represents the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS).
This particular form of the utility function is important for analyzing policies
that can simultaneously a¤ect both the level and the riskiness of a consumers
period-by-period income stream. Note that when  = , the preferences are
equivalent to those under constant relative risk aversion (CRRA).
The workers maximize utility (5) by investing a portion of their disposable
wage income into the four available assets. Since the old cohort liquidates all
of their asset positions, the following notation pertains to the asset holdings
of the young cohort. Each unit of stock ai;t with the corresponding price qi;t
entitles its holder to the future dividend stream di; where  2 ft+ 1; t+ 2; :::g.
Bonds bi;t, measured in the units of home and foreign consumption bundles,
9
respectively, o¤er real rates of return next period equal to 1 + ri;t.4 Each
country has one unit of stock and both bonds are in zero net supply. Young



































t   Ift (8)







A transfer payment  is made whenever the older cohort enters the period
with zero wealth; therefore, if 
i;tt+1 = 0, then I
i
t+1 = 1, otherwise I
i
t+1 = 0.
The period-t wealth 
i;tt of the representative worker is equal to her dis-
posable wage earnings:

i;tt  pi;t [(1   i)wi;t   Ti] (10)
The government can collect social security contributions from the workers in
two ways: as a lump-sum tax Ti or as a fraction  i < 1 of the wage. This
allows us to model both a dened benets PAYG system with Ti and a dened




is the sum of the social security transfers and the payouts of the period-t
4An interesting and related albeit highly theoretical question concerns the potential
of wage- or GDP-indexed assets in increasing intergenerational risk sharing. We do not
pursue it here since such instruments do not yet exist in private nancial markets, although
we refer the interested reader to arguments in, for example, Fischer (1983), Shiller (1999),




h;tt+1  ph;t+1 (hwh;t+1 + Th) + (1 + rh;t) b
h;t
h;t + qt+1 (1 + rf;t) b
h;t
f;t + (11)
(qh;t+1 + ph;t+1dh;t+1) a
h;t




f;tt+1  pf;t+1 ( fwf;t+1 + Tf ) +
1
qt+1
(1 + rh;t) b
f;t





(qh;t+1 + ph;t+1dh;t+1) a
f;t
h;t + (qf;t+1 + pf;t+1df;t+1) a
f;t
f;t
Consumers can short any asset; however, to guarantee the compactness




i;tt+1  0 (13)





min fph;t+1 (hwh;t+1 + Th) + qt+1 (1 + rf;t) bh;tf;t + (14)
(qh;t+1 + ph;t+1dh;t+1) a
h;t






min fpf;t+1 ( fwf;t+1 + Tf ) +
1
qt+1





(qh;t+1 + ph;t+1dh;t+1) a
f;t
h;t + (qf;t+1 + pf;t+1df;t+1) a
f;t
f;tg
2.3 Closing and solving the model
The state of nature of the model economy in period t is given by the beginning-





the ve exogenous shocks zt = fet; wh;t; wf;t; dh;t; df;tg, and tax policies T =
fTh; Tf ; h;  f ; g. A competitive equilibrium is a price system Pt  fqt; ph;t; pf;t; qh;t; qf;t; rr;t; rf;tg,




























1. given the price system, the allocation and asset positions solve the home
and foreign consumersutility maximization problems, and
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i;t = yi;t (16)
ah;ti;t + a
f;t
i;t = 1 (17)
bh;ti;t + b
f;t
i;t = 0 (18)
for i = fh; fg.
The model is solved globally over a compact state-space grid following the
methodology outlined in Stepanchuk and Tsyrennikov (2015). As detailed in
Staveley-OCarroll and Staveley-OCarroll (2017), in order to minimize com-
putational time, we reduce the number of endogenous state variables to one
through a series of variable re-denitions. The two retired cohortswealth
levels are combined into an aggregate 
t 1t :

t 1t  ph;t (hwh;t + Th)+pf;t ( fwf;t + Tf )+(qh;t + ph;tdh;t)+qt (qf;t + pf;tdf;t)
(19)








The borrowing constraint (13) guarantees the compactness of the state space
and restricts the wealth ratio !h;t 1t to lie within the [0; 1] interval. The wealth
ratio is su¢ cient to describe the endogenous state variables in the model. The
control variables Pt, At, and Ct and the transition equation for the wealth
ratio can be expressed as functions of the exogenous state zt, tax policies T ,
and the one endogenous state variable !h;t 1t .
We rely on numerical simulations of the model to uncover the channels that
link the national choice of the pension system to the resulting welfare of the
home and foreign consumers in both cohorts. We next describe the calibration
choices used in these simulations.
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2.4 Calibration
The benchmark specication is described in Table 1; unless otherwise indi-
cated, all parameters describing the foreign economy are identical to the ones
in the home country.
Each period in the model represents 25 years; thus, we assume that each
worker starts his life and career at the age of 25, retires at the age of 50, and
lives until the age of 75. We set the intertemporal discount factor  = 0:375;
given the 4% annual real rate of return (r) commonly assumed in the business
cycle literature and the 25-year duration of each period in our model (T ), the
parameter  solves (1 + r)T =  1.
The EZ preference parameters  and , which control the degree of risk
aversion and the EIS, govern consumer portfolio choices and are therefore cru-
cial for understanding the patterns of international capital movements. Un-
fortunately, there is no consensus in the literature on the empirical estimates
of these parameters. We do not wish to take a stance on a particular set of
values for  and ; rather, we want to elucidate the impact of consumer risk
and time preferences on the resulting investment decisions. To this end, in
the baseline calibration we follow the (average) ndings of van Binsbergen et
al. (2012) and set  = 0:5 and  = 60, and later perform several robustness
checks to study these parametersimpact on our ndings.
We assume that home and foreign goods are imperfect substitutes in con-
sumption,  = 1=3, and let the average home bias parameters be h = f =
0:75.5 The degree of trade openness changes by 5% relative to the average, so
that fe1; e2g = f 0:05; 0:05g.
We use the moments of the annual series for U.S. compensation of employ-
ees and capital income (expressed in real per capita terms and HP-ltered)
to calibrate the processes for model wages and dividends. To this end, we
set h;w = 0:522 and h;d = 0:513, equivalent to the annual wage and div-
idend autocorrelations of 0:62 and 0:47, respectively. We normalize the av-
5Notice that, given the CES aggregators (1) and (2), the elasticity of substitution between
home and foreign goods is equal to 11  .
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Table 1: Benchmark parameter values
Parameter Description Value
 Intertemporal discount factor 0:375
 Relative risk aversion coe¢ cient 60
 Inverse of elasticity of intertemporal substitution 0:5
h; f Average consumption home bias 0:75
 Import/export elasticity of substitution 1=3
Wi;1;W i;2 Wage realizations for i 2 fh; fg 0:745; 1:255
Di;1; Di;2 Dividend realizations for i 2 fh; fg 0:257; 0:592
i;w Persistence in the wage process for i 2 fh; fg 0:522
i;d Persistence in the dividend process for i 2 fh; fg 0:513
Th Pension tax, lump sum (with h = 0) f0:10; 0:28; 0:47g
h Pension tax, distortionary (with Th = 0) f0:124; 0:362; 0:599g
erage wage and dividend in each country to 1 and 0:42 to match the share
of capital to labor income in the U.S. Based on this normalization, we set
fWh;1;Wh;2g = f0:745; 1:255g and fDh;1;Dh;2g = f0:257; 0:592g to produce
the volatilities observed in the data.6
We consider two di¤erent versions of the model: DB, with the lump-sum
pension tax Th > 0 (and h = 0), and DC with only a distortionary tax
h > 0 (and Th = 0). The calibration of the pension taxes and benets, taken
directly from Staveley-OCarroll and Staveley-OCarroll (2017), is somewhat
convoluted by the assumption that there is an equal number of workers and
retirees in our model. If we match the level of the tax burden on the workers,
we signicantly underestimate the resulting benets per retiree. On the other
hand, matching the pension benets requires setting the level of tax far above
that observed in the data. To compromise, we simulate the model using three
di¤erent tax values listed in the last two rows of Table 1: low (matching the
empirical tax burden), high (matching the retirement benets), and middle
(the average of the rst two).
6See Staveley-OCarroll and Staveley-OCarroll (2017) for a detailed explanation of the
calibration strategy and for data sources and descriptions.
14
3 Distribution of aggregate risks
In a closed economy setting, a social planner who cares equally about all gen-
erations redistributes the aggregate output wh;t+dh;t to equalize the marginal
utilities of consumption of both cohorts (see, for example, Bohn, 2009). Given
the utility functions (5) and (6), this requirement simplies to ch;tt = c
h;t 1
t ,
implying perfect intergenerational risk sharing. Extending this nding to a
two-country setting, a global social planner who can capture and reallocate
the output across borders would additionally ensure that the marginal utili-








a familiar condition in two-country settings with complete asset markets (Chari,
Kehoe, and McGrattan, 2002). As such, relative consumptions and the RER
should be perfectly correlated.
3.1 Benchmark social planner problem
A social planner who cares equally about all agents maximizes the combined
utility of all agents in the model constrained only by the goods clearing con-
ditions (16) given the exogenous shock processes zt. Using Lagrangian multi-
pliers, h;t and f;t, the social planners intratemporal problem can be written
as follows:




























We plug the denition of the consumption bundles (1) and (2) into the utility
functions (5) and (6), and maximize over consumption of home and foreign
goods by all cohorts to nd the optimal solution. Note that the Lagrangian
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multipliers are the shadow prices of the home and foreign goods, and can thus














Therefore, a social planner would optimally make home and foreign consump-
tion equal across generations and the ratio home and foreign consumption
perfectly correlated with the RER.
These optimality conditions can be thought of as two separate goals of the
social planner. First, the equality conditions in (22) and (23) implies that the
planner is concerned about inequality. Because the young and the old cohorts
in each country have the same preferences, an imbalance between their con-
sumptions reduces aggregate welfare. Second, equations (2224) imply perfect
risk sharing between all four cohorts. Thus, we can contemplate two potential
roles for social security in our model: alleviate inequality within countries, and
share risk between all agents. While inequality is fairly straightforward, we
discuss risk sharing in detail below.
3.2 Incomplete markets private solution
We next compare the risk-sharing outcomes in the baseline specication (no
pension system in either country) and in the benchmark versions with the
DB and DC pension plans (at home only) to those of the social planner (SP)
framework described above.8 To do so, we simulate each of the three specica-
tions 1,000 times for 1,100 periods starting from a symmetric state of nature
where wealth is evenly distributed between countries; we then discard the rst
7See Appendix B for the derivations of the optimal conditions of the social planner.
8Throughout the paper, "baseline" will refer to symmetric parameterization of the model
in the absence of a pension system, and "benchmark" will refer to the model calibration
with the average level of taxes (either lump-sum or distortionary).
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100 periods to reduce the impact of the initial conditions on the nal results.9
The data in the tables that follow are generated by computing the average
of each relevant variable over the 1,000 remaining periods in each simulation,
and then nding the mean of the averages across the simulations.
Since, in our model, the nancial markets are incomplete, agents are not
able to share risks fully either within or across countries. Moreover, the two-
cohort OLG structure means that the young and the old cannot use private
markets to transfer risk across generations. Perfect pooling of risk would mean
that all agents in the model can share their idiosyncratic risks with all other
agents in the model: young workers born during a period of low wages should
receive a transfer from the old cohort, and an adverse shock to dividends
should trigger a transfer from the young cohort. However, the agents cannot
form such contracts because these risks are realized as soon as the young cohort
is born. Thus, it is too late for the two existing generations to enter into risk-
sharing arrangements with each other, as it is impossible for the young to sign
contracts with the (as yet unborn) generation that will follow them before the
next periods risks are realized. As such, the young face a disproportionally
high wage risk, and the retirees are overexposed to the dividend risk. The lack
of diversication of human and nancial capital risks reduces agentswelfare
as long as wage and dividend streams are imperfectly correlated.
The lack of intergenerational risk-sharing exhibited in the OLG framework
inhibits the ability of the RER to e¤ectively transfer risk between the two
countries. In innitely-lived agents models, international risk-sharing is more
the product of RER movements that result from productivity shocks than the
outcome of a complex nancial market (Cole and Obstfeld, 1991). Because
intergenerational risk sharing is so low, the RER cannot accommodate risk-
sharing between the four distinct cohorts.10 To some extent, changes in goods
and asset prices in response to the shocks generate wealth transfers which a¤ect
9Each specication is simulated using the same 1,000 shock histories (each 1,100 periods
long). Thus, the di¤erences in the outcomes are driven solely by the changes in the structure
of the pension system.
10See Staveley-OCarroll and Staveley-OCarroll (2019) for a discussion of (the lack of)
international risk sharing in two-country OLG models.
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1:00 0:44 0:35 0:46
Table 2: The degree of risk sharing under di¤erent assumptions about the
home pension system. SP in the second column refers to the outcomes of the
social planner problem. The baseline version of the model features to pension
systems in either of the two economies. Setting Th > 0 (h > 0) represents
the DB (DC) structure of the home pension system.
risk sharing across the di¤erent groups of agents, but such e¤ects are small in
magnitude. Column 3 of Table 2 reveals that baseline simulation of the model
has far less risk sharing than the optimal levels derived in the social planners
solution above (column 2). This outcome sets up the central question of the
paper: to what extent can a state-run PAYG pension system rectify the key
risk-sharing issue in the model that the workers are not directly exposed to
dividend shocks and the retirees are not directly exposed to wage shocks?
The optimal portfolios of the home agents are presented in Table 3. The
baseline portfolio composition is driven by the particular parameterization of
the utility function. Setting  = 0:5 (EIS) and  = 60 (risk aversion) means
that the worker treats current and future consumptions as substitutes, and is
very risk-averse within a given period. Since the households are not exposed
to the wage risk in the second period of their lives, they invest in a fairly even
split between home and foreign equity to pool the second-period dividend risk.
They also go long in home and short in foreign bonds. The bond positions help
to pool the nontradable rst-period wage risk. Following a high realization of
the home wage which raises home output, the RER depreciates, benetting
the foreign agent. Going long in home and short in foreign bonds amplies
this mechanism: the RER depreciation increases the cost of repaying foreign
debt, further improving the extent of wage income risk sharing.11 The net
11An attentive and thorough reader may notice the di¤erence in the optimal portfolios of
the home agents presented here versus the ones described in Staveley-OCarroll and Staveley-
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Baseline Th= 0:28 h= 0:36
Home equity as a percent of home portfolio 0:53 0:45 0:60
(0:001) (0:005) (0:007)
Foreign equity as a percent of home portfolio 0:47 1:66 0:15
(0:001) (0:028) (0:001)
Home bonds as a percent of home portfolio 0:49 0:79 1:01
(0:003) (0:005) (0:005)
Foreign bonds as a percent of home portfolio  0:49  1:90  0:76
(0:003) (0:038) (0:012)
NFA as a percent of home GDP 0:00  0:05  0:07
(0:001) (0:001) (0:001)
Table 3: Portfolio holdings of the home (young) worker. Equity holdings are
measured as fractions of the total quantity of the corresponding equity asset.
The baseline version of the model features to pension systems in either of the
two economies. Setting Th > 0 (h > 0) represents the DB (DC) structure of
the home pension system.
foreign asset (NFA) position as a percent of home GDP is close to zero due to
the baseline model symmetry.
The introduction of the pension system in the home country signicantly
a¤ects the portfolio choices of the workers. In essence, the government intro-
duces a new asset that cannot be traded in nancial markets and which can
be designed to alter the exposure of the retirees to labor income and of the
workers to capital income. The DB and DC setups we explore next di¤er quite
signicantly in the extent to which they allow agents to pool the two sources
of income both within borders and internationally.
The tax that accompanies the DB framework reduces the income of the
young cohort as it transfers their purchasing power toward the next period,
prompting them to increase their (net) borrowing to supplement this tem-
porary loss. At the same time, since Th is not state-dependent, their second-
OCarroll (2019). These di¤erences are driven by the change in the preferences specication:
EZ in the present paper and CRRA (log utility) in the latter publication. Since the house-
holds in this paper are less concerned with intertemporal consumption smoothing and more
interested in lowering within-period consumption volatility, there is less intergenerational
risk sharing and more international risk sharing here relative to the earlier paper.
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period wealth











This encourages the home workers to invest more heavily in equity. The pref-
erence for foreign over home equity is driven by the asymmetry in the global
provision of state pensions: foreign workers must rely solely on their private in-
vestments to nance consumption in retirement and so choose safer bonds over
riskier equity to reduce its expected volatility.12 The impact on risk-sharing
(Table 2, column 4) is to allow consumption patterns to move more in sync
within the foreign country as it unloads its risky assets onto the home country.
This benet comes at the cost of reduced risk-sharing intergenerationally in
the home country, although this result should not be surprising: the lump-sum
transfer from the young to the old not only fails to expose the retirees to the
wage shock, but also reduces the income of the workers. Finally, international
risk sharing (between the two groups of workers) falls as well, as the home
worker now experiences a more volatile after-tax wage income.
The DC pension system, on the other hand, improves risk sharing in each
of the four groups relative to the baseline level. It does so by pooling the
risk of the wage shock between the old and young cohort in the home country,
directly addressing one of the key reasons for low baseline risk sharing discussed
above. Knowing that the pension payout is now stochastic, the home worker
shifts away from risky equities to a (relatively more) safe portfolio that is
long in debt assets (Table 3, column 4). This home-country benet spills
over to the foreign economy, since now all four agents are exposed (via the
rebalancing of their equity and bond holdings) to uctuations in the home
wage. Our results suggest that the DC pension system can to some extend
substitute for the incomplete private nancial market: it o¤ers a hedge against
nancial asset risk by providing a labor income-based benet. This observation
corresponds to the ndings in Shiller (1999) and Krueger and Kubler (2006): in
an environment where returns to capital and labor are imperfectly correlated,
a PAYG social security system enables agents to pool the two sources of income
and thereby helps to reduce the consumption variance of all generations. The
12The resulting "venture capitalist" pattern of asset holdings is further discussed in
Staveley-OCarroll and Staveley-OCarroll (2017).
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benets of the DC social security system may therefore be sensitive to the
degree of correlation between the labor and dividend shocks in the model. We
perform the corresponding robustness checks in Section 5.
Finally, it is worthwhile pointing out that this risk-pooling benet of the
DC system is independent of the number of cohorts in the model. In settings
where multiple generations are alive concurrently, older workers who have al-
ready accumulated some nancial wealth may be able to pool the dividend
and wage risks using private markets. Even so, the pension system enables
retirees, who by denition no longer participate in the labor markets, to share
their portfolio risk with the labor income risk of the concurrent workers.
4 Welfare Implications
4.1 Measures of Welfare











of the agents using equations
(5) and (6). In the exposition below, hats ("^") to refer to the baseline spec-
ication; we let i = fh; fg denote the home and foreign agents, respectively,
and j = ft; t  1g refer to the young and the old cohorts, respectively.
Following the addition of either the DB or the DC program, we can measure
the benet to the four agents of living in a world with a social security system
(in the home country) as follows. For each cohort, we calculate a scalar CV i;jt
that equates the baseline lifetime utility level ̂i;jt with that obtained under
















The variables CV i;jt represent the compensating variations additional amount
of current consumption required to make the consumer indi¤erent to having
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the social security system in place.13 A positive (negative) value of CV i;jt
means that the addition of a pension system makes the consumer worse o¤
(better o¤). (Recall that we are comparing two long-run stochastic equilibria
that exclude any transitional period considerations.) Working through the
denitions of CV i;jt and ̂
i;j
t results in the following equality:
CV i;jt = c
i;j
t   ĉi;jt :
Since the compensating variations are measured in units of home and for-
eign consumptions bundles, they can be easily aggregated:





CVt  CV ht + qtCV
f
t ;
allowing us to study the distribution of aggregate welfare across generations





















The calculations, shown in columns 24 of Table 4, reveal that a DB social
security system in the home country increases the welfare of the old cohorts in
the model at the expense of the working cohorts. This outcome is broadly con-
13Note that the utility function of the young worker assumes that she will also receive
compensation in the future period. This is necessary to allow for the aggregation of com-
pensating variations in a specic period without double-counting the benets of the social
security payments in the form of current payments to the current retired cohort and expected
future benets for the current young cohort.
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sistent with the ndings in Shiller (1999), who illustrates the underlying cost
of all PAYG social security systems. The young workers are taxed to pay for
the old cohorts retirement benets and so lose out on returns that could have
accrued on these funds.14 When a PAYG system is rst introduced, the cur-
rent retirees receive a payout from a system to which they never contributed.
This nancial gap persists over time as the consecutive generations of workers
lose the potential earnings on pension tax payments that could otherwise have
been saved.15 To some extent, the home worker compensates for this loss by
investing more heavily in (foreign) equity to earn the above-average rate of re-
turn; nonetheless, the net benet to the home young of the DB social security
system is negative. (We should note, however, that our model abstracts from
many real-world features, such as savings myopia or the uncertainty of life
duration in retirement, adding which could lead to a much higher net benet
of a government-run pension system from the worker perspective.)
Once aggregated over generations, our results suggest that the costs to the
home country of implementing a DB pension system are accompanied by gains
in the foreign country (notice that cvht > 0 and cv
f
t < 0). The source of these
gains is twofold. First, the social security system that impoverishes the young
workers at home causes them to become net debtors (recall the negative NFA
position reported in Table 3). Correspondingly, the young foreign cohorts nec-
essarily become net lenders, providing them with higher lifetime consumption
(although, as Table 4 indicates, this benet applies to the second period of
14Since in our model there is no population growth, the implied rate of return on social
security contributions is zero.
15It is fairly straightforward to calculate the corresponding burden on the workers. The
present discounted value of the (innite sum of the) foregone returns r on tax payments





. Given the 25-year discount factor  = 0:375 and the
three values of the tax we consider, Th = f0:1; 0:28; 0:46g, we can calculate that workers
lose a cumulative income of f0:167; 0:468; 0:768g, depending on the level of the lump-sum
tax. Expressed relative to the average real output (1:425), these foregone risk-free earnings
are equal to f11:72%; 32:83%; 53:93%g of home GDP. Feldstein and Leibman (2002) report
similarly-sized losses using a stylized model of social security: even if only one seventh of
the pension taxes were diverted to savings, the present value of consumption losses due to
social security would be more than double the value of the gain to the rst generation of
retirees.
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Th= 0:1 Th= 0:28 Th= 0:46  h= 0:124  h= 0:36  h= 0:6
cvh;tt 8:48 30:80 74:16 12:14 43:39 102:32
cvf;tt 0:37 1:10 1:78  0:82  0:85  0:58
cvh;t 1t  0:96  4:28  7:63 11:35 11:87 7:16
cvf;t 1t  6:96  16:89  25:58  17:65  29:97  37:49
cvht 3:73 10:83 20:35 12:07 27:47 43:49
cvft  3:06  7:88  12:74  9:39  16:69  21:67
cvt  0:02  0:12  0:33  0:15  0:55  1:03
Table 4: Welfare cost, in percent of current consumption, of social security
system in the home country,
Notes. (a): All statistics are signicant at the 1 percent level.
life). Second, the safety net provided by the DB system allows the foreign
workers to transfer some of their risk to the home investors (Table 3, column
2). Thus, the national pension system provision in the home country allows
its consumers, through the nancial market linkages, to share the reduction
in their lifetime income risk internationally. However, since the gains to the
foreign young are expected rather than realized, the biggest benet of the
pension system accrues to the foreign retirees, who get to enjoy the lower-risk
payout of their higher retirement wealth. As discussed in the previous section,
this creates greater risk sharing within the foreign country (Table 2, column
3).
Finally, shown in the last row of Table 4, the global welfare improves
slightly following the addition of a DB pension system in one of the countries.16
The DB pension in our model is structured as a simple lump sum transfer and,
as such, does nothing to improve the overall risk sharing within the model.
Where, then, does this small yet statistically signicant benet come from?
The answer lies in the redistributive properties of the social security system.
Recall from equations (22) and (23) that the social planner would optimally
set consumptions within each country equal. However, as illustrated in the
16Since the home country maintains a negative NFA position in both DB and DC setups,
the average RER is greater than one. Consequently, the seemingly higher percentage losses
at home are more than o¤set by the corresponding gains abroad.
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Baseline Th= 0:28  h= 0:36
ch;tt 0:77 (0:007) 0:61 (0:007) 0:54 (0:004)
ch;t 1t 0:64 (0:005) 0:68 (0:007) 0:58 (0:004)
cf;tt 0:77 (0:007) 0:77 (0:007) 0:78 (0:007)
cf;t 1t 0:64 (0:005) 0:77 (0:006) 0:92 (0:007)
Table 5: Levels of current consumption for the baseline and benchmark DB
and DC systems.
second column of Table 5, the young cohorts do not save enough to smooth
their consumption over the two periods of life.17 This suboptimal behavior is
partially mitigated by the DB pension system (column 3 of Table 5), which by
taxing the young and transferring the proceeds to the retirees substantially
reduces the inter-cohort consumption gap in each country.
4.3 Dened Contribution
In reality, most social security systems are structured as hybrids of pure DB
and DC frameworks, since the government can bridge the gap between the
volatile income tax revenue and the guaranteed benet payouts by borrowing
or saving. The computational constraints imposed by our model, however,
require the government to run a balanced budget every period, so that pension
contributions match payouts at all times. However, to better understand the
ndings reported above, we replace the DB pension with a DC system by
setting Th = 0 and h > 0.
The results, shown in columns 57 of Table 4, reveal that a DC social
security system in the home country increases the welfare of both foreign
cohorts in the model at the expense of the home cohorts. The home workers
pension payment is now procyclical, and so the young cohort that enters the
workforce during the period of low wages is relatively more shielded from the
shock than in the DB setup. On the other hand, in addition to su¤ering the
17This result may be partially driven by the assumed value of EIS: setting  = 0:5 implies
that current and future consumptions are viewed by households as imperfect substitutes.
We test the robustness of our results to changes in this parameter value in Section 5.
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costs of the foregone investment earnings while young, the home cohorts also
receive relatively little safety from their pension payments, which now uctuate
together with wages. Consequently, the home consumer no longer takes on as
much portfolio risk when young and so does not enjoy higher consumption
during her retirement. Abroad, in addition to earning returns from being net
lenders, foreign cohorts also hold more of the home countrys risk (Table 3,
column 3). This portfolio shift from the DB to the DC system amplies both
the gains to the foreign cohorts and the losses to the home cohorts.
The welfare gains to the foreign country outweigh the losses to the home
economy even more so than under the DB setup, ranging from 0:15% to 1:03%
of global output. This is less the result of consumption redistribution (which
is not as e¤ective as in the DB case; see column 4 of Table 5) and more the
outcome of the improved risk sharing (Table 2, column 5).
5 Robustness checks
The above welfare results are broadly robust to a series of parameter changes.
Before diving into the details, we would like to highlight the universally un-
changed conclusion of our paper: the introduction of a pension system in one
economy produces global welfare gains.
5.1 Dened benet
Table 6 describes the results of parameter value changes on the welfare gains/losses
in the benchmark DB system. In all specications, the loss in the home country
is more than o¤set by the spillover gains in the foreign country.
The literature has not yet reached consensus on the appropriate value of
the EZ preference parameters. Since the assumed form of the utility func-
tion is of key importance to the resulting welfare calculations, we repeat
our simulations for several additional combinations of the two parameters:
(; ) = f(2; 0:5) ; (60; 2) ; (1; 1)g, the latter corresponding to log utility of con-
sumption. Lowering the degree of risk aversion (column 3 of Table 6) changes
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the magnitudes of the resulting welfare gains and losses, but produces only one
change in the sign: the home retirees now experience welfare losses following
the addition of the DB pension system. Since all agents in the model are made
less risk averse, the benet to the older cohort of having a guaranteed second-
period income is lowered. The cost of foregone income due to the tax burden
more than o¤sets the now smaller gains from having a retirement safety net.
Notably, lower risk aversion leads to larger global welfare gains stemming from
lower inequality between the cohorts.
Setting  = 2 makes current and future consumptions complementary and
therefore increases householdsdesire to smooth consumption intertemporally.
Consequently, international consumption inequality is likely to become more
persistent over time. As a result, the costs of the social security system are
now completely contained within the home country whereas all of its benets
are transferred abroad. Assuming complementarity between rst and second
period consumption also increases the volatility of prices (and, in particular,
of the RER), since for any given endowment shock a larger relative price
movement is required to shift consumer spending to the more plentiful good.
Coupled with the more persistent consumption inequality, this RER dynamic
amplies the foreign welfare gains relative to the losses su¤ered in the home
country. Nonetheless, even though driven by di¤erent factors, the magnitude
of the country-specic welfare outcomes is almost unchanged relative to the
benchmark.
The third sensitivity exercise ( =  = 1) collapses EZ preferences to log
utility, a specication widely used in international macroeconomic literature.
The result of this parameter change essentially combines the above two robust-
ness checks: the welfare values are fairly similar to the  = 2 specication,
while their signs follow the pattern of the  = 2 check. As before, the main
conclusion remains the same: the cost of the pension system is borne by the




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1  can signicantly a¤ect the extent of cross-border risk
sharing via the RER. The parameter estimates in the literature, however,
range from  =  3:55 (complements) to 0:83 (substitutes), as reported in
Bodenstein (2010). As home and foreign goods are made more complementary
(setting  =  1=3), RER volatility increases: an ever larger RERuctuation is
necessary to shift demand between the two goods. This substantially increases
the social security gains to the older home cohort, since wealth cannot be
transferred abroad as easily.
The last three tests assuming positive correlation between dividends and
wages within each country, between home and foreign dividend processes, or
changing the extent of home bias in consumption produce only minor changes
in the welfare results.
5.2 Dened contribution
Table 7 describes the outcomes of the same series of robustness checks relative
to the benchmark DC system.
As described in Section 4.3, the welfare results in the DC framework are
driven more by improved risk sharing than income redistribution. Unsurpris-
ingly, therefore, lowering risk aversion from 60 to 2 lowers the absolute value
of all compensating variations since agents are now less sensitive to the risks
inherent in the model. More importantly, the benchmark gains to the foreign
workers from unloading their country-specic risks onto the home young are
now turned into losses. On the other hand, changing the EIS parameter from
0:5 to 2 has less of an e¤ect on the overall results than under the DB speci-
cation, since EIS a¤ects the degree of consumption inequality which is less
important to welfare in the DC framework. The gains in the foreign country
and the losses in the home country are more evenly spread out, which is ex-
pected when households improve consumption smoothing (Table 7, column 3).
The next column shows that the benchmark results are fairly robust to the log
utility specication.
Assuming that imports and exports are complements ( =  1=3) rather
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than substitutes ( = 1=3) reduces international risk-sharing. Consequently,
the aggregate welfare gains from improved risk sharing due to a DC pension
system increase substantially from 0:55% to 1:30% of global output.
As in the previous subsection, adding positive within-country wage-dividend
correlations or cross-country dividend correlation, or lowering the degree of
home bias in consumption produce only minor changes in the welfare results
relative the benchmark calibration.
6 Conclusions
This paper analyzes the (possibly unforeseen and perhaps unintended) inter-
national risk-sharing and welfare consequences of national pension systems in
a setting where risks cannot be fully traded between generations in private
nancial markets. We show that these consequences depend critically on the
particular structure dened benet or dened contribution of the system.
Our main ndings are twofold.
First, asymmetries in the provision of national retirement systems produce
international risk-sharing spillovers via the nancial market linkages. Under
the DB setup, home workers can share the risk reduction in their lifetime in-
come, induced by the pension system, with the foreign consumers: the latter
can o­ oad some of their risky assets in exchange for relatively safer bonds.
Thus, the existence of the DB PAYG system in one country can indirectly
improve the extent of intergenerational risk sharing in the other. As opposed
to the DB structure, the DC system leads to much higher risk sharing within
generations and internationally. Home young and old are now sharing wage
risk more equally, and this risk can also be hedged internationally via appro-
priately chosen portfolios of the home and foreign workers.
Second, the addition of the pension system in the home country is welfare-
reducing for the home young (and, in the DC case, for the home retirees as
well) but leads to welfare gains abroad. The latter stem from the willingness
of home investors to take on additional risk associated with foreign equity
(DB) and/or from the foreign country becoming a net international lender as
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home workers seek to supplement the loss of their current income to the so-
cial security tax with foreign borrowing. Once again, we should note that the
simplifying assumptions of the model, necessary for computational considera-
tions, require that our welfare results be interpreted as supplementary to many
other welfare gains and losses associated with social security and documented
elsewhere in the literature.
An important question for future research is how the two-cohort results
generalize to overlapping-generations models with multiple cohorts alive con-
currently. In such settings, older workers with access to both wage and div-
idend income may be able to pool the corresponding risks with the younger
cohorts, thus mitigating the welfare e¤ects reported in this paper. Another
(complementary) way to allow for intergenerational risk sharing that extends
beyond the two generations alive at a particular point in time would be to in-
troduce government debt or a pension fund to our framework. Doing so would
allow for wealth transfers and smoothing of shocks across multiple periods,
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